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Most nuclear power plants now utilize solid grounded low voltage systems. For safety and
reliability reasons, the low voltage (LV) high resistance grounding (HRG) system is also
increasingly used in the pulp and paper, petroleum and chemical, and semiconductor in-
dustries. Fault detection is easiest and fastest with a solidly grounded system. However, a
solidly grounded system has many limitations such as severe fault damage, poor reliability
on essential circuits, and electrical noise caused by the high magnitude of ground fault
currents. This paper will briefly address the strengths and weaknesses of LV grounding
systems. An example of a low voltage HRG system in the LV system of a nuclear power
plant will be presented. The HRG system is highly recommended for LV systems of nuclear
power plants if sufficient considerations are provided to prevent nuisance tripping of
ground fault relays and to avoid the deterioration of system reliability.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
An electrical system grounding method should provide the
safety, reliability, and continuity of service required by the
power distribution system. In the past, ungrounded systems
were preferred when reliability and continuity service were
very important. However, ungrounded systems provide no
control over a destructive transient overvoltage. In addition,
experience with multiple failures due to arcing ground faults
has caused a change in philosophy about the use of an
ungrounded system. Solidly grounded and high resistance
grounded systems have become the standard for large in-
dustrial complexes [1e3].K. Chang).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on beha2. Low voltage ground fault protection
Electrical facilities should be inspected periodically before and
during operation by authorized institutions. Before the design
of a ground fault protection system, applicable laws and reg-
ulations must therefore be carefully reviewed. Technical
feasibility, reliability, and practicality with respect to the
ground fault protection system should be considered.2.1. Applicable laws and regulations
Based on electrotechnical regulations in Korea, equipment
that has exposed metal parts, is rated at a voltage higher thanCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
Table 1 e Expected touch voltage and maximum clearing
time.a
Touch voltage U (V) Z (U) I (mA) t (sec)
50 1,725 29 ∞
75 1,625 46 0.60
100 1,600 62 0.40
125 1,562 80 0.33
220 11,500 147 0.18
300 1,460 205 0.12
400 1,425 280 0.07
500 1,400 350 0.04
a See Table A in IEC 61200-413 [11].
Fig. 1 e The TN grounding system. N, neutral; PE,
protective earth; PEN, protective earth and neutral.
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place where people can easily come into contact with the
equipment should be equipped with a ground fault protection
device that can automatically detect and clear any ground
fault. However, this equipment is exempt from the installa-
tion of ground fault protection if the equipment is maintained
by a qualified engineer or installed in a dry area so that the
possibility of electric shock is very low. However, the
exemption is not applied to low voltage (LV) circuits that are
rated higher than 400 V and coupled with high voltage circuits
through the transformer.
Since the formation of the World Trade Organization
agreement, the industrial standards of Korea have conformed
to the related International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
standards. The electrical regulations have accordingly been
revised or admitted as a parallel requirement with the IEC
standards, and harmonization of the industrial standards of
Korea with the IEC standards is ongoing. The design of the
electrical distribution systems of nuclear power plants was
developed on the basis of the technologies and practices of the
United States of America.
International standards and practices need to be applied to
the design of electrical distribution systems while taking into
consideration the changes of technical circumstances in the
industry. Up-to-date technologies should also be applied to
design and construct more reliable and safer electric power
systems.
2.2. Types of LV grounding systems
Ground fault protection is a part of the safety protections
specified in IEC 60364-4-41; this protection has a close relation
with the protection against electric shock. Under general
conditions, the allowable continuous touch voltage of the
human body is 50 V. A protective device is required to limit the
touch voltage below the allowable continuous touch voltage
when a human body is in contact with the conductive part of
equipment.
The fault current circulation path is determined by the
grounding system. Therefore, the grounding system of the LV
system should be designed before determining the ground
fault protection scheme. The LV grounding system is classified
as Class 1, 2, and 3 in the conventional system, and as TN, TT,
and IT in IEC Standard 60364. In the conventional grounding
system, the earthing resistance (i.e., the resistance between
the earth and the grounding conductor) is specified by the type
of grounding. On the other hand, IEC 60364 evaluates the
safety level by the estimated touch voltage and maximum
fault clearing time instead of by specifying the earthing
resistance. However, the ultimate goal is the same: to limit the
magnitude and continuing time of the fault current passing
through the human body at safe levels with regard to the
average impedance of the human body and expected touch
voltage. Table 1 shows the relationship between the expected
touch voltage and the maximum clearing time.
2.2.1. The TN system
InTNsystems, asdepicted in Fig. 1, the integrity of the earthing
of the installation depends on a reliable and effective
connection of the protective earth andneutral (PEN) conductoror the protective earth (PE) conductor to earth. The neutral
point or themidpoint of the power supply system is earthed. If
a neutral point or midpoint is unavailable or inaccessible, the
line conductor is earthed. Exposed conductive parts of the
installation are connected by a protective conductor to the
main earthing terminal of the installation, which is connected
to the earthed point of the power supply system.
In fixed installations, a single conductor may serve as the
protective conductor and as a neutral conductor (i.e., PEN
conductor), provided that the requirements of section 543.4 of
IEC 60364-5-54 are satisfied. No switching or isolating device is
inserted in the PEN conductor.
The characteristics of the protective devices and the circuit
impedances fulfill the following requirement:
Zs  Ia  Uo (1)
in which Zs is the impedance [in ohms (U)] of the fault loop,
which comprises the source, the line conductor up to the point
of the fault, and the protective conductor between the point of
the fault and the source; and Ia is the current [in amperes (A)]
that causes the automatic operation of the disconnecting de-
vice within the time specified in Table 2. When a residual
current protective device (RCD) is used, this current is the
residual operating current that provides the disconnection in
the time specified in 411.3.2.2 or 411.3.2.3 of the IEC 60364-4-41
[4], and Uo is the nominal alternating current (AC) or direct
current (DC) line to earth voltage [in volts (V)].
2.2.2. The TT system
All exposed conductive parts collectively protected by the
same protective device are connected by the protective
Table 2 e Maximum disconnection times.
System TN (s) TT (s)
AC DC AC DC
50 V < Uo  120 V 0.8 Notea 0.3 Notea
120 V < Uo  230 V 0.4 5 0.2 0.4
230 V < Uo  400 V 0.2 0.4 0.07 0.2
Uo > 400 V 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.1
AC, alternating current; DC, direct current.
a Disconnectionmay be required for reasons other than protection
against electric shock.
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 2 1 1e2 1 7 213conductors to an earth electrode common to all of these parts.
Where several protective devices are utilized in series, this
requirement is applied separately to all exposed conductive
parts protected by each device. The neutral point or the
midpoint of the power supply system must be earthed. If a
neutral point or midpoint is unavailable or inaccessible, the
line conductor must be earthed.
Generally in TT systems (Fig. 2), RCDs are used for fault
protection. Overcurrent protective devices may alternatively
be used for fault protection, provided a suitably low value of Zs
is permanently and reliably assured.
Where an RCD is used for fault protection, the following
conditions must be fulfilled [5]. The disconnection time, as
required by Table 2 and Eq. (2), is the following:
RA  IDn  50 V (2)
in which RA is the sum of the resistance in ohms (U) of the
earth electrode and the protective conductor for the exposed
conductive parts, and IDn is the rated residual operating cur-
rent of the RCD.
Where an overcurrent protective device is used, the
following condition will be fulfilled:
Zs  Ia  Uo (3)
in which Zs is the impedance in U of the fault loop, which
comprises the source, the line conductor up to the point of the
fault, the protective conductor of the exposed conductive
parts, the earthing conductor, the earth electrode of the
installation; the earth electrode of the source, Ia, is the currentFig. 2 e The TT grounding system. Ia, current (in amperes);
N, neutral; PE, protective earth.in amperes that causes the automatic operation of the dis-
connecting device within the time specified in Table 2; Uo is
the nominal AC or DC line to earth voltage.
2.2.3. The IT system
In IT systems (Fig. 3), live parts are insulated from earth or
connected to earth through a sufficiently high impedance.
This connection may be formed either at the neutral point or
themidpoint of the systemor at an artificial neutral point. The
latter may be connected directly to earth if the resulting
impedance to earth is sufficiently high at the system fre-
quency. Where no neutral point or midpoint exists, a line
conductor may be connected to earth through a high
impedance.
The fault current is low in the event of a single fault to an
exposed conductive part or to the earth, and automatic
disconnection in accordance with Table 2 is not imperative,
provided the condition in Eqs. (4) and (5) is fulfilled. However,
in the event of two faults existing simultaneously, provisions
should be taken to avoid the risk of harmful effects on a per-
son in contact with simultaneously accessible exposed
conductive parts.
Exposed conductive parts should be earthed individually,
in groups, or collectively. The following condition will be ful-
filled [6]:
In AC systems, RA  Id  50 V (4)
In DC systems, RA  Id  120 V (5)
in which RA is the sum of the resistance (in ohms) of the
earth electrode, protective conductor for the exposed
conductive parts, and grounding register (optional); and Id is
the fault current (in amperes) of the first fault of negligible
impedance between the line conductor and the exposed
conductive part. The value of Id takes into account the leakage
currents and the total earthing impedance of the electrical
installation.
In IT systems the following monitoring devices and pro-
tective devicesmay be used: (1) insulationmonitoring devices;
(2) residual current monitoring devices; (3) insulation fault
location systems; (4) overcurrent protective devices; and (5)
residual current protective devices.Fig. 3 e The IT grounding system. Ia, current (in amperes);
N, neutral; PE, protective earth; RN, neutral ground
resistance.
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nuity of supply, an insulation monitoring device indicates the
first fault from a live part to exposed conductive parts or to
earth. This device initiates an audible and/or visual signal,
which continues as long as the fault persists. If there are both
audible and visible signals, it is permissible for the audible
signal to be cancelled.
Except where a protective device is installed to interrupt
the supply in the event of the first earth fault, a residual cur-
rent monitoring device or an insulation fault location system
may be provided to indicate the first fault from a live part to
exposed conductive parts or to earth. This device initiates an
audible and/or visual signal, which continues as long as the
fault persists.2.3. Coordination problems in LV grounding
To date, the TN (i.e., solidly grounded) system is a commonly
usedmethod of grounding for nuclear power plants (Fig. 4). The
ungrounded system isnot recommendedbecause the system is
actually grounded through the distributed cable capacitance.
As a result of this capacitance, a certain amount of capacitive
current will always flow through a line to the ground fault. In
addition, archingground faults ona large “ungrounded” system
can cause transient overvoltage of several times the normal
voltage, which may cause motor failure [2].
Ground fault protection on a solidly grounded system
provides a quicker andmore sensitive means of detecting and
clearing ground faults, compared to ground fault protection inFig. 4 e The typical ground protection scheme for the LV
system.other grounding systems. However, quick and sensitive
detection of a ground fault may result in miscoordination. In
many circumstances, themain breaker trips because of a fault
at an insignificant downstream feeder or branch. For example,
the most common coordination problem in a 480 V system is
caused by the ground fault protection system having a
downstream phase device that miscoordinates with an up-
stream ground fault protection device, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4, the main breaker of the load center has no ground
fault protection (GFP) device. The time GFP relay is instead
installed on the neutral ground line of the LV distribution
transformer. The load center branch breakers have separate
GFP devices that are instantaneous or have a time ground
overcurrent relay. The branch breakers of the motor control
center (MCC) have a separate ground fault relay (GFR), except
circuits in which the molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) is no
greater than 30A and load of the motor no greater than 15
horse power.
In that circumstance, the MCC branch breakers, which
have no GFR, may not properly coordinate with the GFR
on the load center branch breaker, and the MCC feeder
breaker can trip a ground fault associated with MCC branch
breakers. This type of miscoordination is quite common
when a LV system is installed without a coordination study.
Better coordination can be obtained by performing a detailed
short circuit and coordination study in conjunction with
installing downstream GFP devices. However, in most cir-
cumstances, compromise is necessary, and maximum reli-
abilitymay not be attained using a solidly grounded system in
the LV system.
2.4. Arcing faults and arc resistance
Short circuit and coordination studies commonly focus on
only bolted three-phase or phase-to-ground faults. However,
failures rarely involve bolted faults in practical equipment.
The faults are normally of the arcing type, which has arc
resistance, and this resistance must be taken into consider-
ation. On LV equipment, an arc voltage in the range of 150 V
has been developed. This voltage is relatively insensitive to
current, which indicates the arc resistance is variable [2].
Unlike a bolted fault, an arcing fault uses ionized air as the
conductor. The cause of the fault normally burns away during
the initial flash and the arc is sustained by the establishment
of a highly conductive, intensely hot plasma arc. The intense
heat vaporizes the conductors' barriers and superheats the
surrounding air, and results in an explosive volume-metric
increase within the space. The consequence is an intense
pressure wave, deafening sound, blinding light, toxic gases,
molten metal, and shrapnel. This is often referred to as an arc
blast. Unless action is taken to quickly remove the fault or to
redirect the arc blast, the brunt of these items will impact
people, equipment, or both. The magnitude of the arcing fault
is only 43e57% of a bolted fault, so traditional overcurrent
protection may not detect and clear the fault before the full
impact of the arc develops and causes damage or injury [7].
For many years, different methods to limit arc flash expo-
sure and incident energy have been introduced. The use of a
high resistance grounded system minimizes the amount of
damage created from the fault.
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One of the most common reasons for not using a high resis-
tance system is that, in any practical power system, single-
phase or three-phase four-wire loads are to be fed. If most
loads are three-phase four-wire loads, HRG is most likely
impractical. However, if most of the loads are three-phase
three wire type loads (i.e., motor loads), a HRG may still be
an option [2].Fig. 5 e The zero-sequence network of high resistance
grounded system.
Table 4e The charging current of 480 V low voltage cables
for a class 1E load center and the motor control center3.1. Design considerations
The design of a high resistance grounded system is quite
simple for the delta-wye transformer. The first step in the
design is to calculate the distributed capacitance, Xc, of the
charging current of the system. Table 3 shows the typical
charging currents of LV cables [8]. The accuracy of cable
capacitance is not critical in this calculation, but measure-
ment of the actual charging current during commissioning is
preferable.
To prevent the possibility of transient overvoltage, the
zero-sequence resistive ground fault current, IRO, should be
equal to or greater than the charging current, ICO. In the zero-
sequence circuit shown in Fig. 5, the resistance and equivalent
capacitance are parallel. Because the resistor is installed in the
neutral of the transformer, the zero-sequence current 3I0 will
flow through the resistor. As a result, that current makes the
apparent resistance of the grounding resistor seem three
times as large.
Based on the circuit in Fig. 5 the resistance and current flow
are approximated, by the following equations:
IR0 > IC0 (6)
IC0 ¼ Vn
XC0=3
½A (7)
IR ¼ Vn
R
½A (8)
Symmetrical component calculations are represented by
IR ¼ 3IR0 and IC ¼ 3IC0, and Vn is the phase-to-neutral voltage.
The neutral grounding resistance size (Rn) and capacity are
determined by the following equation:Table 3 e The 480 V low voltage system cable charging
current.
Cable size
AWG (mm2)
Charging
current/1,000 ft of 3C
Installation type
350e500 MCM 0.10A Conduit
2/0e3/0 0.05A Conduit
2/0e3/0 0.02A Tray
#6 0.05A With ground wires
in water
Transformers Negligible
Motors 0.01A/1,000 hp
AWG, American wire gauge; hp, horse power.Rn ¼ Vn
IR
½U (9)
Resistance capacity ¼ I2R*Rn ½W (10)
In an APR 1400 nuclear power plant, the total power cable
length of the LV circuitsdfed from a typical Class 1E distri-
bution transformer rated at 1,000 kVAdis 65,882 feet. The size
and length of cables, installation types, and charging currents
are shown in Table 4. The total charging current of all the
cables is 2.29A. It can be assumed that the charging current of
all cables is 0.05A per 1,000 ft of threewire cables, based on the
cable installation type. The charging currents of the trans-
formers and motors are negligible. Therefore, IR can be
determined as 3.0A, based on the safety margin. Thus, the
following applies:
Rn ¼ Vn
IR
¼ 480
 ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
3:0
¼ 92:37U (11)
Resistance capacity ¼ 32  92.37 ¼ 831.33 W (12)
Typical resistance and wattage range for 480 V grounding
resistors are 60e300 U and 260e1,300 W, respectively [1].belong to the load center.
Cable size Length (ft) Charging current (A)
Ampere/3C Installation
1C-750KCM 28,516 0.48 Tray
1/C-500KCM 1,640 0.03 Tray
3/C-350KCM 434 0.02 Tray
3/C-#4/0 3,000 0.15 Conduit
3/C-#1/0 1,658 0.08 Conduit
3/C-#4 2,142 0.11 Conduit
3/C-#6 300 0.02 Conduit
3/C-#8 8,252 0.41 Conduit
3/C-#10 6,624 0.33 Conduit
3/C-#12 13,316 0.67 Conduit
Total 65,882 2.29
MCC, motor control center.
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a high resistance grounded system. The grounding resistor
has taps, which allow fine tuning of the resistance during
installation and commissioning. A voltage monitoring relay
(VMR), a GFR, a pulse generator, and a control circuit are
provided with the resistor to detect and locate ground
faults.
Low voltage systems with loads, which produce harmonic
currents, may result in false alarms or trips of GFRs. The
harmonics are produced by rectifiers, DC drivers, variable
speed AC drivers, and other electronic switching devices that
are connected to the power system. In that circumstance,
installing a harmonic filter on the HRG system or an isolation
transformer at an individual driver is a good practice thatmay
alleviate nuisance alarms or trips [9].3.2. Operation theory of the HRG system
If a ground fault occurs in a LV circuit, the voltage is induced
on the resistor by the ground fault current. When the induced
voltage is greater than the setting, the VMR is activated, which
energizes the trip and/or the alarm circuit. The auxiliary
contact of the VMR and the GFR is connected in series and
gives a trip or alarm signal to the incoming Air Circuit Breaker
(ACB) of the load center, as shown in Fig. 4.
The pulse generator aids locating the ground fault. The
closing and opening of the shorting contact changes the
magnitude of the grounding resistor. The pulse current then
follows through the ground faulted feeder and groundingFig. 6 e Scheme of the high resistance grounding system
ground fault detection. AD: Ampere Device, CL: Current
Limit, CTR: Control Transformer, GND: Ground, GRES:
Ground Resistor, MR: Meter, PC: Pulse Contact, STB: Short
Terminal Block, TRES: Test Resistor.resistor. In that situation, a portable hook-on detector is used
to locate the feeder, which creates a fluctuation in the de-
tector. The ground fault current is limited by the ground
resistor. Therefore, all grounding resistors should not be
shorted at the same time. If not, very high ground fault
currents may flow through the neutral line of the distribution
transformer.
3.3. Setting of the ground fault relay
The following is an example of the relay setting for the above
proposed HRG system. When a solidly grounded fault occurs
in a feeder with zero ground resistance, 277.12 V is induced on
the grounding resistor. However, solidly grounded faults
rarely occur. Therefore, the VMR is set at a voltage lower than
277.12 V. The resistive current IRO during a ground fault should
be equal to or greater than ICO. The setting voltage is accord-
ingly determined as a little higher than 211.5 V (i.e.,
92.37 U  2.29 A).
The time ground fault current relay (51G) is also set at the
current slightly higher than the cable charging current.
Approximately 2.5A (y 2.29 1.1) is recommended as a pickup
current. However, the actual pickup level is determined by the
cable charging current measured during the test operation.4. Conclusion
The HRG system corresponds to the IT grounding system
described previously in section 2.2 and in IEC 60364-4-41. The
HRG system offers the best compromise of the service conti-
nuity of ungrounded circuits and the safety of solidly groun-
ded circuits in LV systems (i.e., 440e600 V). The capacitive
current on LV systems is sufficiently low (i.e., less than 5A) so
that the resistive controlled current remains low to avoid
escalating the fault current and causing equipment damage.
Proper application of a high resistance grounded system will
limit the transient overvoltage of arching faults to an accept-
able value.
Therefore, the HRG system is highly recommended for LV
systems in nuclear power plants, especially for the Class 1E
system, which is required to operate under any operation
condition. The HRG system was allegedly inapplicable to
three-phase four-wire systems. However, three-phase four-
wire loads and/or single-phase loads can be accommodated
by using an isolation transformer.
The HRG systemmay be used to trip a breaker or initiate an
alarm. If it is used for alarming, the ground fault should be
located and cleared within a predetermined timescale. While
the ground fault persists, the voltage on the two ungrounded
phases can elevate up to 73% greater than the nominal line-to-
ground voltage.
The complete HRG systemdresistor, fault detection and
location scheme, alarm, and relays with control circuitsd-
should be adequately designed and installed to take advan-
tage of all benefits of high resistance grounding. In addition, a
systematic assessment should be conducted for all systems
important to nuclear safety to confirm that the design ach-
ieves the reliability requirements of the system design bases
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